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ABSTRACT. This paper studies social interactions in a game theoretic model with players
in a large social network. We consider observations from one single equilibrium of a large
network game with asymmetric information, in which each player chooses an action from
a finite set and is subject to interactions with her friends. Simple assumptions about the
structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In particu-
lar, we show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence (NDD)
condition requiring that dependence between any two players’ decisions decays with their
network distance. The formulation of such an NDDproperty is novel and serves as the basis
for statistical inference. Further, we establish the identification of the structural model and
introduce a computationally feasible and efficient estimation method. We illustrate the esti-
mation method with an actual application to college attendance, as well as in Monte Carlo
experiments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, network effects on social behaviors has become important in so-
cial theory (see e.g. Granovetter, 1985). In particular, economics has been encouraged to
broaden its scope to the analysis of social interactions while maintaining the rigor that
is emblematic of economic analysis (Manski, 2000). Recently, game theory has played a
central role in this regard and a leading example is the study of network formation by
Bala and Goyal (2000). In this paper, we propose a network game of incomplete infor-
mation to study large–network–based social interactions. Simple assumptions about the
game structure are made to ensure a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium satisfies a
decaying network effects condition. We then establish identification and estimation of the
structural primitives using data from a single large network.
The structure of our network game follows the “preference interaction” approach sug-
gested by Manski (2000). Specifically, a player’s payoff from choosing an action over al-
ternatives depends on other players’ simultaneous actions as well.1 Instead of interacting
with all players on the social network, we assume each agent is only affected by the choices
of her direct best friends. We call it as “local” interactions, a notion that was first intro-
duced by Seim (2006) in the context of industrial organization. Such a specification is par-
simonious, but rich enough to generate the interdependence of all agents’ choices, which
is shaped by the way the network gets connected. For example, teenagers are inclined to
be affected by their friends in terms of adolescent risky behaviors (see e.g. Nakajima, 2007),
but such local effects can spread through the network. In particular, they are indirectly af-
fected by the behaviors of their friends’ friends, because their friends are interacting with.
In equilibrium, all teenagers from the same network will affect each other directly or indi-
rectly.
Our local interaction specification differs from the “linear–in–mean” approach widely
used in the literature on social interactions (see e.g. Manski, 1993). The latter captures the
notion that an individual’s behavior depends on the average behavior of all other social
members. The local interaction approach is attractive in the study of large–network–based
1In particular, we assume each player’s payoff relevant covariates (including friend relationship) are public
information, but payoff shocks (i.e. the error terms) are private information of the player.
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social interactions: First, our model allows one to study the counterfactuals and the policy
effects from the change of network graph. In contrast, much of the theoretical literature on
network interventions have long focused attention on qualitative features like the stability,
but not quantitative effects. A second advantage is that an equilibrium in our local inter-
action model exhibits features that reflect how the large network connects players to each
other. Last but not least, the strategic effects between any pair of friends in our model are
not diluted by the large size of the network, which is a typical feature in linear–in–mean
models.
By restricting the interaction strength to be sufficiently mild, we establish the unique-
ness of the equilibrium. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is always crucial and of interest to
both theoretical and empirical sides in game theory. In the presence of multiple equilib-
ria, it is quite difficult to characterize the whole set of equilibria in a large network game:
When the network is not regular, we cannot use a Markov–type of equilibrium solution
concept to simplify empirical analysis like in the dynamic model inference. Another more
fundamental concern is the “incompleteness” of the econometric model due to the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria (see Tamer, 2003). In the empirical game literature, uniqueness
can also be found in, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Xu (2014).
While there are strategic interactions among friends in a large network, players’ choices
are mutually dependent on each other. Intuitively, one would expect such a dependence to
decay with the network distance. Under primitive conditions on the strategic components,
we show that the dependence of a player’s equilibrium choice on her friends’ choices de-
cays (exponentially) with network distance, a so–called “network decaying dependence condi-
tion” (NDD condition) that more or less amounts to the restrictions for a stationary solution
in the autoregressive model. Our NDD condition is related to a number of dependence de-
cay conditions used in the time series and spatial analysis (see e.g. Jenish and Prucha, 2009).
When the data come from the equilibrium of a single large network game, all observations
are dependent on each other due to strategic interactions. The NDD implies that any two
players’ decisions are closer to be independent if they are farther away from each other.
The formulation of NDD is novel and serves as the basis for our statistical inference.
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For estimation, a key challenge arises because it is costly to solve the equilibrium ana-
lytically or numerically. We propose a new approach that approximates the equilibrium
solution by solving n (i.e. the number of players) Bayesian games ofmuch smaller size, one
for each player. Specifically, for player i, a Bayesian game is tailored from the original one
by cutting off all those players whose network distances from i are larger than h (h ∈ N).
The set of players left on the sub–network, as well as their payoffs, action space, informa-
tion structure and so on, defines a smaller–sized Bayesian game. We solve this subnetwork
game and use the equilibrium solution of player i to approximate her equilibrium strategy
in the original large network game. The tuning parameter h is chosen carefully depend-
ing on the network size n, i.e., h needs to increase with n at an exponential rate such that
approximation errors are negligible for the limiting distribution of the estimator. By this
approximation, we then define an approximated maximum likelihood estimator (AMLE),
which is shown to be asymptotically equivalent to the infeasible MLE.We useMonte Carlo
experiments to illustrate the proposed estimation method, which performs well.
It is worth pointing out that our asymptotic analysis is based on the number of players
going to infinity, instead of the infinite repetition of the same game with a small fixed num-
ber of players. The latter asymptotic approach is used by most of the existing empirical
game literature, e.g. Bjorn and Vuong (1984), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Brock and Durlauf
(2001) and Tamer (2003). Our asymptotic analysis applies to observations coming from one
or a small number of large networks. In a a seminal paper, Menzel (2015a) characterizes
the asymptotic distribution of a large matching market. The analysis is similar in spirit to
our approach in terms of using the limiting distribution as the number of players goes to
infinity to approximate the distribution of the equilibrium in a large game. An important
difference is that in Menzel (2015a) the strategic effects that cause the endogeneity issue
become negligible as the number of players increases to infinity, which is not the case in
our asymptotic analysis.
We apply our methods to study college attendance decisions of high school students by
using the data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
The Add health data is a longitudinal survey containing a nationally representative sam-
ple of adolescents in the United States during the 1994–95 school year. A unique feature
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in Add Health data is the availability of respondents’ social network information, which
is reconstructed by students’ best friends nominations in the survey. Applying the pro-
posed estimation procedure, we find statistically significant, positive peer effects, which
has a similar scale to other empirical findings of peer effects on youth behaviors using
the similar or earlier datasets. See e.g. Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) and
Gaviria and Raphael (2001) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and
provide descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we introduce the network game model and
establish the uniqueness of the BNE and the NDD condition. In Sections 4, we establish
identification of the model. In Section 5, we propose an estimation procedure. To present
basic ideas, we first show the proposed estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the MLE
and derive its asymptotic properties. We then study its finite sample performance by using
Monte Carlo experiments. Applying the proposed method, we also present the baseline
coefficient estimates and compares themwith alternative empirical results in the literature.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. DATA
We study peer effects on college attendance of high school students using data from the
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), which is a longitudinal
survey containing a nationally representative sample of adolescents in the United States
during the 1994–95 school year. A unique feature of the Add Health data is the availability
of respondents’ social network information, as well as their social and economic charac-
teristics (including college attendance): Each respondent provides his or her friendship
information by nominating at most five male and female best friends, respectively. Intu-
itively, one can then reconstruct the whole friendship network among respondents. All
the respondents in our empirical study come from three high school networks and the to-
tal number of observations is n = 831. A detailed description of the data can be found on
the website of the Carolina Population Center.2
2See http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/data.
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The college attendance decisions must have been made by individual families during a
short period. Following the literature (see e.g. Christensen, Melder, and Weisbrod, 1975;
Leslie and Brinkman, 1988), the exogenous covariates that affect college attendance in-
clude age, household income, GPA, parents’ education level, race, gender, etc. Descrip-
tive statistics are presented in Table 1. The demographic variables, i.e., Household Income,
Mother’s Education and Father’s Education, are recorded by some codes. These codes are
natural numbers increasing with the actual value of variables. The median Household
Income is between $50,000 and $74,999. Mother’s Education and Father’s Education are
coded as 1 = never went to school, 2 = not graduate from high school, 3 = high school
graduate, 4 = graduated from college or a university, 5 = professional training beyond a
four-year college. There is a severe missing data issue in these two variables: we treat
missing observations as value 0. For the observed subsample, the medians of Mother’s Ed-
ucation and the median of Father’s Education are high school graduate. Over the whole
sample, however, both medians are zero.
As amatter of fact, we only use observations from three largest schools. For schools with
small numbers of respondents, the missing data issue is severe. Therefore, the descriptive
statistics in Table 1 are slightly different from other studies on social interactions that use
the whole Add Health dataset (see e.g. Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2009).
The number of friends and the network centrality are two descriptive statistics on the
network structure. Player i’s network centrality is defined by the number of players who
take i as a friend, i.e., ∑j 6=i 1(i ∈ Fj). In the data, the standard deviation of the number
of friends is less than the standard deviation of the network centrality, which is a typical
feature in social networks.
3. THE MODEL
Following our empirical application, we consider a game theoretic model on social in-
teractions of high school students’ college attendance decisions. All these students are de-
noted as players indexed by i ∈ N ≡ {1, · · · , n}, with exogenously determined locations
on the school network. Using the terminology in graph theory, a vertex of the network
denotes a student and a directed edge connects vertex i to j if student j is one of i’s best
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: 3 school networks; Year 1994–1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 17.088 1.138 15 21
Female 0.502 0.500 0 1
Household Income 8.827 2.122 1 12
Mother’s Education* 0.516 1.676 0 11
Father’s Education 1.709 2.955 0 12
Overall GPA 2.376 0.772 0.11 4
American Indian** 0.039 0.193 0 1
Asian 0.140 0.347 0 1
Black 0.084 0.278 0 1
Hispanic 0.348 0.477 0 1
White 0.651 0.477 0 1
Other Race 0.153 0.360 0 1
Number of Friends 1.303 1.575 0 8
Network Centrality 1.303 1.780 0 13
College Attendance 0.535 0.499 0 1
*Missing observations have been treated as 0.
**Note that some observations are associated with more than one race.
friends. Following the network distribution theory (see e.g. Barabási and Albert, 1999), we
can view the high school network as a random graph with vertex connectivities governed
by some probability distribution, and the observed network in our data is a single realiza-
tion of the large random network. Given the network, we denote Fi as the group of i’s best
friends, i.e., the set of students are directly connected to i. Note that friendship may not be
symmetric, i.e., j ∈ Fi does not necessarily imply i ∈ Fj, which is an important feature in
our data. Moreover, let Qi = #Fi be the number of i’s best friends. In our game theoretic
model, we assume the school network structure is public information. Therefore, Fi is also
public information.
Moreover, we assume each player i simultaneously chooses a discrete action Yi ∈ A ≡
{0, 1, 2, ...,K}. Following the convention, let Y−i denote a profile of actions of all other play-
ers. Let further Xi ∈ SX ⊆ Rd be a vector of player i’s payoff relevant state variables,
which are publicly observed by all players, as well as the researcher. Further, player i
observes a vector of action–specific payoff shocks labeled as ǫi ≡ (ǫi0, · · · , ǫiK) ∈ RK+1.
We assume that ǫi is i’s private information, i.e., ǫi is not observed by any j 6= i.3 In our
3It should be noted our specification rules out unobserved heterogeneity, which is observed by all the players
but not the researcher.
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empirical application, Yi is binary indicating colleague attendance, where action 1 denotes
the college attendance; Xi is a vector of demographic variables including e.g. age, gender,
GPA, parents’ education, household income and race; Moreover, ǫi is an idiosyncratic pref-
erence shock for college attendance. For expositional simplicity, we denote all the public
state variables associated with student i by Si ≡ (X′i , Fi)′.
Players interact with each other through their utilities. Specifically, we specify player i’s
payoff from choosing an action k ∈ A as follows
Uik(Y−i, Si, ǫi) = βk(Xi) + ∑
j∈Fi
αk(Yj,Xi,Qi) + ǫik, (1)
where βk(·) is a choice–specific function, and αk(·, ·, ·) measures the strategic effects on i’s
payoff (of choosing k) from her friend j’s decision. In our specification, the strategic effects
depend on the state variable Xi as well as Qi. Because only the differences of choice–
specific payoffs matter to decision makers, hence, w.l.o.g., we normalize the mean utility
of action 0 by letting β0(x) = α0(ℓ, x, q) = 0 for all x ∈ SX, ℓ ∈ A and q ∈ N. Let
θk = (βk, αk)′ and θ = (θ′1, · · · , θ′K)′ be the structural parameters of the game, which are
unknown functions.
It is worth pointing out that our model can be extended to allow for exogenous inter-
action effects, i.e., player i’s payoffs Uik depends on Xj for all j ∈ Fi. See e.g. Manski
(1993) and Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009). Our approach could be modified to ac-
commodate such an extension.4 In our empirical application on college attendance, high
school students are less likely to make their attendance decisions according to friends’ de-
mographic variables (e.g. Household income, Parents’ education level and Overall GPA).
On the other hand, such payoff relevant covariates of friends can affect each individual’s
decision indirectly through her expectation on friends’ equilibrium choices.
In our setting, direct interactions on payoffs only occur among friends. Although interac-
tions are local, strategic effects can spread throughout the whole network if no subnetwork
is isolated. For instance, each player needs to consider the decisions by the friends of her
friends. This is because those decisions are relevant to her friends’ choices which thereafter
4We thank a referee for this point.
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affect her payoffs. In the equilibrium, each player’s strategy depends on all other players’
public observables {(Xj, Fj)}j 6=i as well as her own state variables (Xi, Fi).5
3.1. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). Let Sn = (S1, · · · , Sn) be all the public informa-
tion in the network game. For simplicity, we will suppress the subscript n in Sn unless the
subscript is necessary. To discuss the equilibrium solution, we fix the public state variable
S.
In this Bayesian game, player i’s strategy is a function ri(·|S; θ) that maps her private
information ǫi to a discrete choice Yi. Following the BNE solution concept, player i’s equi-
librium strategy, denoted as r∗i , maximizes her (conditional) expected payoff given all other
players equilibrium strategies r∗−i, i.e.,
r∗i (ǫi|S; θ) = argmax
k∈A
E [Uik(Y−i, Si, ǫi)|S, ǫi]
= argmax
k∈A
[
βk(Xi) +
K
∑
ℓ=0
{
αk(ℓ,Xi,Qi)× ∑
j∈Fi
P
(
r∗j (ǫj|S; θ) = ℓ
∣∣S, ǫi)}+ ǫik
]
, ∀i. (2)
Thus, eq. (2) defines a simultaneous equation system in terms of
(
r∗1 , · · · , r∗n
)
.
To characterize the BNE solution, we first make the following assumption on the private
information ǫi.
Assumption A. Let ǫik be i.i.d. across both actions and players and conform to an extreme value
distribution with a density function f (t) = exp (−t) exp [− exp (−t)] .
Assumption A has been widely assumed in the discrete choice model literature, as well as
in empirical discrete games (see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2002; Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov,
2010). The independence of ǫi across players in assumption A implies that players’ equilib-
rium choices are conditionally independent given S. Therefore, the network dependences
of players’ decisions are all characterized by the dependence of players equilibrium strate-
gies r∗i on the common state variable S.
By assumption A, we can rewrite (2) in terms of equilibrium choice probabilities. Let
σ∗ik(S; θ) = P (r
∗
i (ǫi|S; θ) = k|S) and σ∗i (S; θ) = (σ∗i0(S; θ), · · · , σ∗iK(S; θ))′ be the equilibrium
5A recent work by Manresa (2013) develops a reduced form to assess the dependence structure from social
interactions in a linear setting.
9
choice probabilities of action k and the action profile, respectively. Let further Σ∗(S; θ) =
(σ∗1 (S; θ), · · · , σ∗n (S; θ)) be the equilibrium choice probability profiles of all players. By (2)
and assumption A, we have
σ∗ik(S; θ) =
exp
[
βk(Xi) + ∑
K
l=0
{
αk(ℓ,Xi,Qi)×∑j∈Fi σ∗jℓ(S; θ)
}]
1+ ∑Kq=1 exp
[
βq(Xi) + ∑
K
l=0
{
αq(ℓ,Xi,Qi)×∑j∈Fi σ∗jℓ(S; θ)
}] , ∀i, k. (3)
Note that solving the BNE solution {r∗1(·|S; θ), · · · , r∗n(·|S; θ)} to eq. (2) is equivalent to
solving {σ∗1 (S; θ), · · · , σ∗n (S; θ)} from (3). See Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010).
Equation (3) is the common logit functional form, except for the presence of the equilib-
rium choice probabilities of i’s friends. The existence of a solution follows Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem. Next, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and then show the
equilibrium satisfies a decaying dependence condition. Both uniqueness and the decaying
dependence condition are crucial for our empirical analysis.
3.2. Unique equilibrium. The insight for deriving the unique equilibrium comes from the
linear spatial autoregressive model literature: Strong interactions among individuals can
induce multiple equilibria in a simultaneous equation system. To obtain the uniqueness of
the BNE, we need to restrict the interaction strength to be sufficiently mild.
Assumption B. Denote λ ≡ KK+1 · sup(x,q)∈SXQ max k,m,ℓ∈A q|αk(ℓ, x, q) − αm(ℓ, x, q)|. Let
λ < 1.
For estimation, we parametrize αk(ℓ, x, q) by αkℓ/q for some αkℓ ∈ R. Then, assumption B
becomes
max
k,m,ℓ∈A
|αkℓ − αmℓ| < (K+ 1)/K.
Similar to the requirement that all roots lie outside of the unit circle in spatial autoregres-
sive models, such a condition ensures weak dependence.
In our empirical application, each student takes a binary decision for college attendance.
Under the parametrization, assumption B can be rewritten as
max {|α10 − α00|, |α11 − α01|} < 2,
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Note that α00 − α10 and α11 − α01 describe peer effects in social interactions, i.e., the prin-
cipal that friends benefit from choosing the same action. Intuitively, α00 − α10 ≥ 0 and
α11 − α01 ≥ 0 in our empirical context. Therefore, assumption B requires peer effects to be
bounded above. Intuitively, this condition means that the college attendance decisions are
mainly determined by students’ own social and economic characteristics like GPA, house-
hold income etc., and their idiosyncratic preference shock on college attendance as well. If
the average probabilities of friends’ college attendance increase one percentage point, then
the peer effects on her own college attendance probability is limited by λ < 1 percentage.6
Assumption B generally holds in a wide range of empirical studies of youth behav-
iors, including e.g. the substance use, church attendance, academic performance, aca-
demic cheating. See e.g., Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Sacerdote (2001), Kawaguchi (2004),
Carrell, Malmstrom, and West (2008) and Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009).
In these studies, the effects on a player’s equilibrium choice probabilities from her friends’
choices are significantly smaller than one. Although the NDD is a natural condition for
peer effects in our empirical context, numerous prominent exceptions exist. For example,
adolescent risky behaviors like substance (marijuana, alcohol, or tobacco) use are mainly
driven by influence from friends. See e.g. Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and Kawaguchi
(2004). Another leading example is the butterfly effects widely used in e.g. fashion, finan-
cial crisis and gold rush, which characterize the sensitive dependence of players’ choices
on each other.
Lemma 1. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Then, there always exists a unique BNE, regardless
of the number of players n or the realization of the state variable S.
The proof of the uniqueness of the BNE relies on a contraction mapping argument. We
can generalize such a result to the exponential family distribution for the private informa-
tion ǫi.
6To see this, note that assumption B ensures a quasi–Lipschitz condition hold for the best response function:
The best response function Γi(si, {σj : j ∈ Fi}) defined by (10) in the appendix satisfies the following condition:
‖Γi(si, {σj : j ∈ Fi})− Γi(si, {σ˜j : j ∈ Fi})‖1 ≤ λ ·max
j∈Fi
‖σj − σ˜j‖1
where ‖ · ‖ is the L1–norm. See the proof of Lemma 1.
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3.3. Network Decaying Dependence (NDD). We begin with some notation. For any pos-
itive integer h ∈ N, let N(i,h) be the subset of players defined inductively:
N(i,0) = {i} and ∀ h ≥ 1, N(i,h) = N(i,h−1)
⋃ ( ⋃
j∈N(i,h−1)
Fj
)
.
By definition, N(i,h) is the set of players on the social network within h distance of player i
(including i herself). Moreover, let G(i,h) be the network graph that uses vertices and edges
to describe all the connections among N(i,h). Let further S(i,h) =
(
{Xj : j ∈ N(i,h)};G(i,h)
)
.
By definition, S(i,h) describes the subnetwork centered around player iwithin her h–distance,
i.e., how these players are connected to each other and what are the state variables at each
node of the graph. Note that players’ identities do not matter in the definition of S(i,h).
The idea of NDD condition is to examine how player i’s equilibrium choice probability
σ∗i (S; θ) responds to counterfactual changes of some other player j’s public state variable
Sj. Note that in equilibrium σ∗i (S; θ) depends on all the public information S, including Sj
no matter j is i’s friend or not. In a “stable” equilibrium, intuitively such a dependence
should decay with distance. Therefore, the statistical dependence between Yi and Yj also
diminishes with i and j’s network distance.
Definition 1 (Network Decaying Dependence, NDD). In the above network game, the equi-
librium satisfies the NDD condition if there exists a deterministic sequence {ξh : h = 1, · · · ,∞}
with ξh ↓ 0 as h → ∞ such that for any given size n of the network and positive integer h, we have
sup
s,s′∈SS : s(i,h)=s′(i,h)
∥∥σ∗i (s; θ)− σ∗i (s′; θ)∥∥1 ≤ ξh, ∀i = 1, · · · , n, (4)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1–norm, i.e., for any z ∈ Rk, ‖z‖1 = ∑kℓ=1 |zℓ|.
Our notion of NDD is related to the weak dependence in the time–series/spatial literature.
In particular, NDD implies the near–epoch dependence (NED) condition in e.g. Andrews
(1988).7 Different from the time-series/spatial statistical literature that assumes weak de-
pendence of unobserved errors across observations, the dependence of players’ decisions
7This is because by eq. (4), P
(
Yi 6= E[Yi|{(ǫj, Sj) : j ∈ N(i,h)}]
)
is bounded by Kξh.
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results from network–based strategic interactions. Conditional on S, players’ decisions are
mutually independent under assumption A.
In Definition 1, NDD requires the causal effects of Sj on σ∗i to be bounded above by ξρ(i,j),
where ρ(i, j) denotes the network distance from j to i. The game size n is treated as a state
variable. With NDD (and assumption J to be introduced later), if we increase the network
size by keeping adding players to the “fringe” of the network, then the equilibrium choice
probability for any existing player will converge to a limit.8 The next lemma shows that
the equilibrium in our network game satisfies NDD under weak conditions.
Lemma 2. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Then the BNE satisfies NDD with ξh = 2λh+1.
With the NDD, the distribution of the observable variables PYi|S can be nonparametrically
estimated by using data from one single large network as the network size n goes to infinity.
See Appendix D.
4. IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we discuss the identification of the structural parameter θ. Following
Hurwicz (1950) and Koopmans and Reiersol (1950), the definition of identification in a
structural model requires that there is a unique value of the structural parameter θ that
generates the distribution of the observable variables {PYi |S : i = 1, · · · , n}.
Because of the uniqueness of the equilibrium by Lemma 1, σ∗ik(S; θ) is identified by
σ∗ik(S; θ) = P(Yi = k|S). Let δik(S) = lnP(Yi = k|S) − lnP(Yi = 0|S) for each k ∈ A.
By definition, δik(S) is also identified. Moreover, by (3),
δik(S) = βk(Xi) + ∑
ℓ∈A
[
αk(ℓ,Xi,Qi)× ∑
j∈Fi
P(Yj = ℓ|S)
]
, ∀i, k.
8To see this, fix i (i ≤ n) and consider adding new players n+ 1, n+ 2, · · · one by one to an existing network
with n players. Assumption J ensures that for any existing player i ≤ n, the network distance from the added
player n+ k to i, i.e., ρ(i, n+ k), will go to infinity as k goes to infinity, if any new player is added to the fringe
of the previously existing network (i.e., a new player will not decrease the network distance of any pair of
existing players). Therefore, {σ∗i (Sn′ ; θ) : n′ = n,n + 1, · · · ,∞} is a Cauchy sequence if the NDD condition
holds.
13
Let further φiℓ(S) = ∑j∈Fi P(Yj = ℓ|S). By definition, ∑ℓ∈A φiℓ(S) = Qi. It follows that
δik(S) = βk(Xi) + αk(0,Xi,Qi)× Qi +
K
∑
ℓ=1
{
[αk(ℓ,Xi,Qi)− αk(0,Xi,Qi)]× φiℓ(S)
}
. (5)
Similar to Robinson (1988), eq. (5) is essentially a partial linear model as shown in Lemma 3.
Equation (5) suggests that βk(·) and αk(0, ·, ·) are not identified separately unless 0 ∈
SQ.9 Hence, we introduce the following normalization on αk.
Assumption C. Let αk(0, ·, ·) = 0 for all k ∈ A.
Next, we assume a rank condition for identification. Let ϕi(S) = (1, φi1(S), · · · , φiK(S))′.
Assumption D (Rank Condition). Given the game size n, the matrix E[ϕi(S) × ϕi(S)′|Xi =
x,Qi = q] is invertible for all (x, q) ∈ SXQ.
Assumption D is testable given that the conditional choice probabilities can be consistently
estimated.
The next theorem establishes the identification of the model. For the sake of simplicity,
let αk(·, ·) = (αk(1, ·, ·), · · · , αk(K, ·, ·))′ be a vector of functions.
Lemma 3. Fix arbitrary n. Suppose assumptions A to D hold. Then the structural parameter θ is
identified, i.e. PY1,··· ,Yn|S(θ
′) 6= PY1,··· ,Yn|S(θ) for all θ′ 6= θ. Specifically, for any (x, q) ∈ SXQ,(
βk(x)
αk(x, q)
)
=
{
E
[
ϕi(S)× ϕ′i(S)|Xi = x,Qi = q
]}−1
E [ϕi(S)× δik(S)|Xi = x,Qi = q] .
Note that the identification result in Lemma 3 is established for each fixed n. For purpose
of estimation and asymptotic analysis, however we need n goes to infinity. Hence, we
replace the rank condition D by the following assumption.
Assumption E (Rank Condition for large n). The matrix E [ϕi(S)× ϕi(S)′|Xi = x,Qi = q]
is invertible for all n sufficiently large and (x, q) ∈ SXQ, i.e., for any (x, q) ∈ SXi,Qi ,
lim inf
n→∞ det
(
E
[
ϕi(S)× ϕi(S)′|Xi = x,Qi = q
] )
> 0.
9To see this, consider the following specification: αk(0,Xi,Qi) = αk(0,Xi)/Qi for all Qi ≥ 1.
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By relaxing conditions in Lemma 3, the next theorem establishes identification of the
model for all sufficiently large n.
Theorem 1. Suppose assumptions A to C and E hold. Then the structural parameter θ is identified
for all n sufficiently large.
The semiparametric identification in Theorem 1 helps the applied researcher to get a
better sense of whether a fully parametric approach relies on ad hoc specification (of the
payoff function) for identification or merely for simplicity of estimation. Analogous rank
condition can be formulated in the fully parametric model that is used for our estimation.
Let βk(x) = x′βk and αk(ℓ, x, q) = αkℓ/q, where βk ∈ Rd and αk ≡ (αk1, · · · , αkK)′ ∈ RK.
LetWi = (X′i , φi1(S), · · · , φiK(S))′.
Assumption F (Rank Condition for linear–index setup). The matrix E (WiW ′i ) is invertible
for all n sufficiently large.
Replace assumption E with F in Theorem 1, then the identification of θk = (β′k, α
′
k)
′ is given
as follows: for sufficiently large n,
θk =
[
E(WiW
′
i )
]−1
E [Wiδik(S)] .
Clearly, variations in the aggregated friends’ choice probabilities φiℓ(S) identify the strate-
gic coefficients αkℓ.
5. ESTIMATION
This section discusses the parametric estimation of the structural parameter θ. In partic-
ular, we specify the payoff function by
Uik(Y−i, Si, ǫi) = X′iβk +
K
∑
ℓ=1
αkℓ × 1Qi ∑j∈Fi
1(Yj = ℓ) + ǫik (6)
where βk ∈ Rd and αk = (αk1, · · · , αkK)′ ∈ RK. Let θk = (β′k, α′k) ∈ RK+d. Moreover, let
β = (β′1, · · · , β′K)′ ∈ Θβ ⊆ RKd and α = (α′1, · · · , α′K)′ ∈ Θα ⊆ RK×K, where Θβ and Θα are
the parameter space for β and α, respectively. Denote θ = (θ′1, · · · , θ′K)′ and Θ = Θβ ×Θα.
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Let {Xi, Fi,Yi}ni=1 be the data generated from the equilibrium of a single large network.
For asymptotic analysis, we consider the network size n goes to infinity, since our empiri-
cal application involves a few large networks. For the data generating process, our asymp-
totics requires the probability distributions ofG(i,h) with arbitrarily fixed h converges to the
same limiting distribution for all i as n → ∞, and the random graph G(i,h) is independent
of G(j,h) given they don’t contain any common element.
We now proceed to motivate our estimation procedure. First, note that under Assump-
tion A, the actions chosen by the players are conditional i.i.d. given S. Thus, we have the
(conditional) loglikelihood function
Lˆ(θ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
1(Yi = k) · ln σ∗ik(S; θ). (7)
Let θˆMLE = argmaxc∈Θ Lˆ(c) be the MLE, which requires to solve {σ∗ik(S; θ) : i ∈ N; k ∈ A}
to (3). In (7), we can verify that all the regularity conditions hold under additional weak
conditions.10 In practice, however, θˆMLE is not computationally feasible when the network
is large. This is because the equilibrium choice probability σ∗ik(S; θ) has no closed–form
expression and its numerical solution is costly to obtain in the large simultaneous equation
system.
The key to our approach is to approximate σ∗ik(S; θ) by some computable solution σ
h
ik(S; θ)
to be defined later, where h is an integer that depends on n such that the approximation
error ‖σhik(S; θ) − σ∗ik(S; θ)‖1 is negligible relative to the sampling error. Thus, we define
our approximated loglikelihood function
Qˆ(θ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
1(Yi = k) · ln σhik(S ; θ). (8)
Further, our estimator maximizes the approximated likelihood, i.e., θˆ = argmaxc∈Θ Qˆ(c).
To define σhik(S; θ), we first define a Bayesian game of smaller size: let N(i,h) be the set of
players and each player j ∈ N(i,h) simultaneously makes a discrete choice Yj ∈ A. More-
over, each player j in N(i,h) has the same state variables (Xj, ǫj) as the original network
10For instance, Lemma 7 in the appendix ensures the differentiability of the objective function.
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game, but player j’s set of friends is restricted to be Fj ∩ N(i,h). In other words, we artifi-
cially removes all the players outside of N(i,h) in the original game. Note that player i is
located at the center of the subnetwork N(i,h). Similarly, {σhik(S; θ) : j ∈ N(i,h), k ∈ A} solves:
σjk =
exp
[
β′kXj + ∑
K
ℓ=1 αkℓ ×
(
1
Q j
∑j′∈Fj∩N(i,h) σj′ℓ
)]
1+ ∑Kq=1 exp
[
β′qXj + ∑
K
ℓ=1 αqℓ ×
(
1
Q j
∑j′∈Fj∩N(i,h) σj′ℓ
)] . (9)
By Lemma 1, there is a unique solution to (9). In this derived subnetwork game, player i is
in the center of the subnetwork and her equilibrium choice probabilities profile is denoted
by σhi (S; θ) =
(
σhi0(S; θ), · · · , σhiK(S; θ)
)
.
By Lemma 2, the approximation error ‖σ∗i (S; θ)− σhi (S; θ)‖1 can be bounded by 2λh+1.11
To control for the approximation error, we choose h to increase with n at a proper rate.12
5.1. Asymptotic analysis. We now establish the consistency and limiting distribution for
the proposed estimator. First, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption G. (i) The parameter space Θ is compact and the support SXQ is bounded; (ii) The
true parameter θ belongs to the interior of Θ.
Assumption H. Let
sup
a∈Θα
max
k,ℓ,m∈A
|akℓ − amℓ| < (K+ 1)/K.
Assumption I. Given any h ∈ N, the probability distribution of G(i,h) converges to a limiting
distribution PG,h as n → ∞ for all i; and G(i,h) is independent of G(j,h) if N(i,h) ∩ N(j,h) = ∅.
Moreover, the payoff covariates Xi are i.i.d. across players given the exogenous random network.
Assumption J. There exists a positive constant c0 ∈ N, which does not depend on n, such that
maxi∈N ∑j 6=i 1(i ∈ Fj) ≤ c0 with probability one.
Assumption K. (i )Let h → ∞ as n → ∞; (ii) Let further h = [h0 · na] for some constant h0 > 0
and a > 0, where [t] is the largest integer that is no larger than t.
11To apply Lemma 2, let Si,h denote the state of the network derived from S by eliminating all the network
connections outside of N(i,h). By definition, Si,h ∈ {s′ ∈ SS : s′(i,h) = S(i,h)}. Moreover, note that σhi (S; θ) =
σ∗i (Si,h; θ), since all players outside of N(i,h) have no strategic effects on players in N(i,h).
12Note that for h = 0, the proposed estimator becomes the classical multinomial logit estimator.
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Let P = K(d+ K) denote the dimension of the parameter θ. Moreover, let fi(Yi|S; θ) =
∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) × ln σ∗ik(S; θ) and Jn(θ) = E
[
∂
∂θ f1(Y1|S; θ) × ∂∂θ′ f1(Y1|S; θ)
]
. The latter is
indexed by n because of the dependence of fi on n through S and σ∗i .
Assumption L. There exists a non–singular P× P matrix J(θ) such that Jn(θ) → J(θ).
Assumption G–(i) ensures that choice probabilities are bounded away from zero so that
the loglikelihood function is bounded. Unbounded regressors can be accommodated us-
ing high order moments restrictions (see e.g. Van de Geer, 1990). Assumption G–(ii) is
standard in the literature. Assumption H strengthens assumption B to hold for all the
values in the parameter space Θ.
Assumptions I and J impose restrictions on the distribution of the state variables as well
as the network connections. For the first half of Assumption I, note that for any given
n and h, the probability distribution of G(i,h) is well defined, since the subgraph G(i,h) is
a mapping to the space of graphs from the n × n matrix with 0− −1 entries. Note that
the subgraph G(i,h) here refers to all subgraphs that are homomorphic to G(i,h),
13 because
players’ identities do not matter in the definition of G(i,h). Moreover, the first half of As-
sumption I also requires that G(i,h) should be i.i.d. across players who are at least 2h–step
faraway from each other in the network. This condition generally holds in the random
graph literature, since conditional on G(i,h) and G(j,h) do not overlap, the graph structure
ofG(i,h) does not provide additional information on howG(j,h) looks like. Moreover, for the
second half of Assumption I, the (conditional on the network connections) independence
of Xi is a strong assumption. In practice, positive statistic dependence across friends’ de-
mographic variables (e.g. age, education, race, etc.) has been emphasized in the sociology
literature (see e.g. Easley and Kleinberg, 2010), which is the so-called “homophily” phe-
nomena. For our asymptotic results to be established, this assumption could be relaxed to
allow for some degree of dependence at the expense of longer proofs.14
13In Graph theory, the notion of graph homomorphism is defined as follows: For a graph G, let V(G) and
E(G) be the set of vertices and the set of edges of G, respectively. Let G and H be two graphs. A mapping
ϕ : V(G) → V(H) is called homomorphism if ϕ preserves edge adjacency, i.e., for every edge {v,w} ∈ E(G),
the edge {ϕ(v), ϕ(w)} belongs to E(H).
14For instance, as is suggested by spatial autoregressive models, one could assume that X ≡ (X′1, · · · ,X′n)′
takes a simultaneous autoregressive dependence structure:
X = Ψ(γ0) ·X + ν,
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Assumption J imposes restrictions on the number of best friends that a single individu-
als could have. Note that the upper bound c0 does not depend on the network size n. This
condition is crucial for the
√
n–asymptotics of the proposed estimator when the data come
from one single large network game: By assumption J and the NDD condition, we can
limit the dependence among all the observations. Similar assumptions can also be found
in, e.g., Morris (2000) for the contagion analysis in local–interaction games.
It is worth pointing out that Assumption J is not imposed in most of the recent empiri-
cal network formation models. Such a restriction, however, can be easily accommodated
in recent network formation models, e.g., Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman
(2010) andMele (2010). On the theoretic side of network formation, e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) introduce a cost for players to maintain a direct friendship link, which similarly lim-
its the number of direct links each individual could have. In our empirical application,
each student was allowed to nominate at most ten best friends. Such a restriction is reason-
able in light of capacity constraints (e.g. time and/or effort) for students to make and keep
their best–friends. Therefore, a network formation model using the same dataset should
impose such a restriction; otherwise the model cannot rationalize the data.
Assumption K–(i) is intuitive for the approximation of σ∗i (S; θ). Moreover, strength-
ening (i), assumption K–(ii) ensures the approximation error is negligible in the limiting
distribution of the estimator.
In assumption L, Jn(θ) is the Fisher information matrix of the n–player game. Assump-
tion L requires that the Fisher information matrix has a non–degenerate limit when the
network size goes to infinity. Note that the convergence of Jn(θ) is implied by Lemma 2
where Ψ is an n× n weight matrix parametrized by a q-dimensional vector γ0 such that diagonal elements of
Ψ are zeros and In − Ψ is non-singular. Moreover, ν ∈ Rn is a vector of i.i.d. errors that are independent of S
and (ǫ1, · · · , ǫn)′. Our asymptotic results established in Theorems 2 and 3 still hold as long as for each k ∈ A,
1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ
∗
ik(S; c)−E [σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ∗ik(S; c)]
}
p→ 0, uniformly holds in c ∈ Θ.
Such a high level condition can be satisfied if the weight matrix is modeled as: Ψjℓ = ψ(min{ρ(j, ℓ), ρ(ℓ, j)})
where ψ is a decreasing function that decays sufficiently fast (i.e., subjects to exponential decay). Moreover,
it is also possible to allow the dependence between Xj and Xℓ, i.e., Ψjℓ, to depend not only on the network
distance between j and ℓ, but also on the distance between j (or ℓ) and other players that connect (directly or
indirectly) to both of them. See e.g. Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002).
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and assumption I, since the distribution S(i,h) convergence to a limit for all i as n → ∞.
Hence, in assumption L, the essential restriction is the non–degeneracy of the limit.
Theorem 2. Suppose that assumptions A and F, G-(i), I, J, and K-(i) hold. Then θˆ
p→ θ.
Given the consistency of θˆ, we now establish its limiting distribution, which is shown to
be identical to θˆMLE under addition conditions.
Theorem 3. Suppose that assumptions A and F to L hold. Then
√
n(θˆ − θ) d→ N (0, J(θ)−1) .
Note that the infeasible likelihood function (7) is indeed what ultimately gives the infor-
mation equality in Theorem 3. Furthermore, the limiting Fisher information matrix J(θ)
can be consistently estimated by
1
n
n
∑
i=1
[ ∂
∂θ
f hi (Yi|S; θˆ)×
∂
∂θ′
f hi (Yi|S; θˆ)
]
,
where f hi (Yi|S; θ) = ∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) ln σhik(S; θ) and ∂∂θ f hi (Yi|S; θ) = ∑k∈A 1(Yi=k)σhik(S;θ) ×
∂
∂θσ
h
ik(S; θ).
Remark. It is a generic aspect of our asymptotic analysis that the size of the network goes to
infinity, but the maximum number of friends each player should remain fixed (i.e. assump-
tion J). Therefore, the collection of state variables {S(i,h) : i ≤ n} becomes an m–dependent
sequence, where m ≤ ch+10 , which is crucial for the
√
n–consistency of the estimator in
the proof of Theorem 3. This aspect rules out the “Small–World phenomenon” (see e.g.
Watts and Strogatz, 1998), often referred to as six degrees of separation (see e.g. Guare,
1990). It should be noted that whether the network is a “small–world” is an empirical ques-
tion that can be verified from the data. In a small–world network, the asymptotic analysis
should allow the (average) number of friends to increase with the size of the network.15 It
seems to be an intriguing challenge to consider Small–World asymptotics.
It is worth pointing out that it is possible to relax assumption J to accommodate some
“intermediate” case of the network structure at the expense of longer proofs. For instance,
consider a network where the maximum number of friends is not bounded from above,
but the distribution of Qi is asymptotically stable (as the network size n goes to infinity)
15Watts and Strogatz (1998) develop a small–world model by rewiring a regular network with n ≫ Qi ≫
ln n≫ 1.
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with finite mean and variance. Hence, there can be a few, but significant number of nodes
with a lot of connections, which however does not render the network to a “Small–World”.
In the following Monte Carlo experiments, we consider such a specification to examine the
finite sample performance of our approximated maximum likelihood estimator.
5.2. Monte Carlo Experiments. This section uses Monte Carlo to illustrate the finite sam-
ple performance of the proposed estimator. In particular, we consider a binary game with
payoff: Ui1(Y−i, Si, ǫi) = X′iβ+ α×
[
1
Qi
∑j∈Fi 1(Yj = 1)
]
+ ǫi1, where α ∈ R and Xi ∈ R2.
Moreover, we consider two representative networks: First, we consider the Circle net-
work specified in Salop (1979), where n players are equally spaced in a circle and each
player has two friends. In the circle network, Qi = 2 for all players and the friendship
relation between each pair of players is also symmetric. The second network is a ran-
dom network. For any i 6= j, we use a random variable ~ℓi,j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} to denote “no
relationship”, “i is j’s friend, but not vice versa”, “j is i’s friend, but not vice versa” and
“mutual friendship”, respectively. For i 6= j, ~ℓi,j is drawn independently from the prob-
ability mass distribution
(
1 − 4n , 1n , 1n , 2n
)
. Moreover, set ~ℓii = 0 for all i. By definition,
Qi = ∑
n
j=1 1(~ℓij ∈ {2, 4}), which conforms to a Binomial Distribution B(n, 3/n). As n goes
to infinity, the mean of Qi remains constant and conforms to the Poisson(3) distribution
asymptotically.
Moreover, we take Xi1 ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5), Xi2 ∼ N(0, 1) and Xi1⊥Xi2. The results for the
other distributional specifications of X are qualitatively similar. Further, we set β = (1, 1)′
which are invariant across all the experiments. According to assumption H, we choose
Θα = [−1.99, 1.99] and set the true parameter α = 0, 0.8, and 1.6, respectively. In particular,
for α = 0, our setting is equivalent to the classical Logit model.
We have performed experiments with the number of players n = 500, n = 1000 and n =
2000. In each design, we first compute the unique BNE given the underlying parameter
value, i.e., we solve the equilibrium by finding a fixed point to (3). With the (numerical)
solution in hand, we are able to simulate the equilibrium decision made by each player.
Regarding estimation, it is crucial to choose the parameter h ∈ N according to the sam-
ple size n. Following assumption K, we set h = [
√
n/10], i.e. h = 2, 3 and 4 with respect
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to the three choices of sample size. It is worth pointing out that the computation time in-
creases with h in a non–linear pattern. For fixed n, we also investigate the performance of
the proposed estimator under different choices of h. The results for different sample sizes
are qualitatively similar and therefore we only report results for n = 1000. In addition, we
perform 500 replications to approximate the finite sample distribution of our estimator.
Tables 2 and 3 report the finite sample performance of the proposed estimator under the
different settings. The numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations. The estimator
is consistent for all these designs and the standard deviation diminishes at the
√
n–rate as
we increase the sample size. In Table 4, we further investigate how the choice of h affects
the performance of θˆ. For n = 1000, it shows that the approximation behaves well by using
h ≥ 3 and additional gains of accuracy are minor from choosing larger h.
TABLE 2. Finite sample performance: β = (1, 1) and (n, h) = (1000, 3)
True value of α Parameters Circle Network Random Network
0 β1 1.0131 1.0292
(0.2454) (0.2493)
β2 1.0036 1.0058
(0.0826) (0.0833)
α 0.0068 0.0109
(0.1326) (0.1402)
0.8 β1 1.0018 1.0204
(0.2468) (0.2557)
β2 1.0091 1.0060
(0.0833) (0.0834)
α 0.8066 0.8023
(0.1042) (0.1114)
1.6 β1 1.0059 1.0179
(0.2464) (0.2721)
β2 1.0008 1.0064
(0.0849) (0.0839)
α 1.6256 1.6169
(0.0950) (0.0930)
5.3. Empirical results for peer effects on college attendance. We now apply our method
to estimate peer effects on high school students’ college attendance decisions. The specifi-
cation of the payoff function is the same as the one used in our Monte Carlo experiments.
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TABLE 3. Finite sample performance of αˆ
True value of α Sample size Circle Network Random Network
0 500 0.0030 0.0033
(0.1954) (0.2004)
1,000 0.0068 0.0109
(0.1326) (0.1402)
2,000 0.0044 0.0022
(0.0962) (0.0968)
0.8 500 0.8032 0.8048
(0.1570) (0.1469)
1,000 0.8066 0.8023
(0.1042) (0.1114)
2,000 0.8036 0.7964
(0.0714) (0.0716)
1.6 500 1.6254 1.6776
(0.1282) (0.1398)
1,000 1.6256 1.6169
(0.0950) (0.0930)
2,000 1.6072 1.6064
(0.0660) (0.0659)
*Note that h = 2, 3, 4 for n = 500, 1000 and 2000, respectively.
TABLE 4. Finite sample performance of θˆ at different h (n = 1000, α = 0.8)
Parameters h = 0 1 2 3 4
Circle Network β1 0.9790 1.0121 1.0155 1.0157 1.0157
(0.2501) (0.2448) (0.2461) (0.2462) (0.2462)
β2 0.9627 0.9967 1.0002 1.0004 1.0004
(0.0821) (0.0845) (0.0848) (0.0849) (0.0849)
α n/a 0.8560 0.8014 0.7974 0.7972
n/a (0.1118) (0.0996) (0.0986) (0.0984)
Random Network β1 0.9649 1.0063 1.0094 1.0098 1.0098
(0.2568) (0.2575) (0.2584) (0.2585) (0.2585)
β2 0.9614 0.9990 1.0023 1.0026 1.0026
(0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0825)
α n/a 0.8957 0.8068 0.7979 0.7968
n/a (0.1289) (0.1063) (0.1033) (0.1028)
Table 5 presents our estimation results. We also provide results using the pseudo MLE
for comparison. The difference reflects the bias due to the misspecification of social inter-
actions. Note that AMLE(h) refers to the approximated MLE with the parameter value h
and the pseudo MLE is equivalent to AMLE(0). From Table 5, the approximation of the
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equilibrium is sufficiently good for h ≥ 2. So we can use AMLE(2) as our estimates. It is
worth pointing out that the estimates of peer effects satisfy assumption B.
The second column of Table 5 contains the corresponding estimates of the pseudoMLE,
which has been typically adopted in the empirical analysis on college attendance. Given
the pseudo MLE estimates, the most striking difference of our estimates (i.e. AMLE(2) in
the fourth column) is that the peer effects coefficient is significant at the 5% level, while
the pseudo MLE implicitly sets it to be zero. Therefore, the ignorance of peer effects in the
empirical analysis on college attendance results in biased estimates, which can be corrected
by increasing h from 0 to 2.
In Table 5, most of coefficients estimates are significant at the 10% significance level.
Regarding race, the coefficients of American Indian, Asian and Black are insignificant, this
is simply due to the fact that all these three categories have only a few observations in
the sample. Moreover, due to missing data issue on parents’ education, one would expect
noisy estimates for the parents’ education coefficients.
Our pseudoMLE estimates are qualitatively similar to those empirical results in Light and Strayer
(2002) who estimate racial effects on college attendance with a Probit model by using the
data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which consists a sam-
ple of respondents born in 1957–1964. In particular, whites are less likely than minorities
to attend college, given other determinants of college attendance are held constant. For
such a comparison, note that peer effects are not considered in Light and Strayer (2002).
Our pseudoMLE results are also consistent with other early empirical evidence on college
attendance. See e.g. Fuller, Manski, and Wise (1982).16
Peer effects estimates provided by AMLE(2) are related to those empirical results in
Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), who also use the AddHealth data to study
peer effects on school performance index. In particular, they specify a linear equation
system for network–based social interactions and obtain statistically significant peer ef-
fects estimates of similar magnitude (i.e., 0.5505 with a standard error 0.1247). Moreover,
16Fuller, Manski, and Wise (1982) use the 1972 National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class
(NLSS72).
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Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and Kawaguchi (2004) use the National Education Longitu-
dinal Study (NELS) dataset and the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 97 (NLSY97)
dataset, respectively, to study peer effects on youth behaviors of high school students, e.g.,
drug use, alcohol drinking, cigarette smoking, church attendance and dropping out. Their
empirical results also provide evidence for significant peer effects of similar magnitude
to our estimates. For example, consider a typical student in our sample whose covariates
take the mean values in Table 1. Suppose all her friends shift their college attendance
probabilities together from 0% to 10%, then her college attendance probability would in-
crease about 1.52% (namely, from 37.93% to 39.45%). Similarly, if all her friends’ college
attendance probabilities shift jointly from 0% to 50%, then it would yield an increase of
11.83%.17
6. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a structural approach to study social interactions in a large net-
work. Our benchmark model assumes that individuals are affected by their friends only
but all individuals are connected to each other directly or indirectly in a single network. By
restricting the strength of interactions among friends, we establish the existence, unique-
ness of the equilibrium and a NDD condition. We further establish the semiparametric
identification of the model and propose a computationally feasible and novel estimation
procedure. The classic MLE method developed in single–agent binary response models is
naturally nested in our approach.
An important extension of the benchmark model is to allow for interdependence be-
tween a pair of friends’ private information. Individuals tend to bond with similar others
as their friends. In sociology, such a phenomena is called “homophily”; see e.g. Easley and Kleinberg
(2010). Homophily leads to friendship between people with similar characteristics (age,
education, race, etc.) and with positively correlated types. The former can be directly
17In a study of tenth graders’ substance use, Gaviria and Raphael (2001)’s estimates imply, for example, that
moving a typical teenager from a school where none of his classmates use drugs to one where half use drugs
would increase the probability by approximately 13%. Similar experiments would yield increases in the corre-
sponding probabilities of 9% for alcohol use, 8% for cigarette smoking, 11% for church attendance, and 8% for
dropping out of school. Moreover, Kawaguchi (2004) show that if a teenager’s perception of the percentage of
his/her peers who use a substance (i.e. marijuana, alcohol, or tobacco) increases by 10%, the probability that
he/she will use the substance increases from 1.4% to 2.6%.
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TABLE 5. Estimation Results
Variable Pseudo MLE AMLE(1) AMLE(2) AMLE(3) AMLE(4)
Age -0.140* -0.135* -0.135* -0.135* -0.135*
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Female -0.028 -0.038 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034
(0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171)
Household Income 0.150** 0.134** 0.134** 0.134** 0.134**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Mother’s Education 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Father’s Education 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Overall GPA 1.749** 1.714** 1.717** 1.717** 1.717**
(0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
American Indian -0.559 -0.575 -0.574 -0.574 -0.574
(0.418) (0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.423)
Asian -0.050 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.043
(0.428) (0.435) (0.435) (0.435) (0.435)
Black 0.206 0.351 0.363 0.364 0.364
(0.455) (0.466) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467)
Hispanic 0.891** 1.043** 1.051** 1.052** 1.052**
(0.223) (0.233) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234)
White -0.703* -0.718* -0.717* -0.718* -0.718*
(0.393) (0.401) (0.401) (0.401) (0.401)
Other Race -1.024** -1.096** -1.097** -1.098** -1.098**
(0.422) (0.430) (0.430) (0.430) (0.430)
Constant -2.680* -2.795* -2.806* -2.806* -2.806*
(1.441) (1.445) (1.446) (1.446) (1.446)
Peer Effects — 0.657** 0.642** 0.640** 0.640**
— (0.297) (0.286) (0.285) (0.285)
LogLikelihood -437.537 -435.063 -434.988 -434.990 -434.990
* significant at 10% level.
** significant at 5% level.
observed from the data. To identify the latter is more challenging to the researcher. In a
discrete game with a (small) fixed number of players, Liu, Vuong, and Xu (2012) establish
the nonparametric identification of homophily in a context of discrete game. Identification
and estimation of homophily in a large network game is an important extension.
Allowing for possible endogeneity of the network is another important research ques-
tion in the study of large–network social interactions. Being popular in a hight school
network might be associated with a possible high draw of payoff shocks for college at-
tendance. Part of the problem could be addressed by taking into account the network
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formation in the first stage, see e.g. Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman (2010),
Mele (2010), Badev (2013) Leung (2014) and Menzel (2015b). In this regards, our identifi-
cation and estimation results are useful for the second stage analysis of social interactions
in the subgame. In a large network game, however, difficulties arise when each player has
a small opportunity set, relative to the large network size, of players to meet with, and
more importantly, such opportunity sets are not observed in the dataset. For the majority
of pairs of distinct individuals, it is unclear whether an unconnected link is due to the lack
of opportunity, or players’ unfavorable desire for such a connection.
As a matter of fact, our results go well beyond the local interaction studied here as they
can be generalized to more general social interaction games. For instance, one can consider
that each player interacts directly with her friends, friends of friends, etc. In particular, the
payoff function can be generalized as follows: for choosing an action k ∈ A,
Uik(Y−i, Si, ǫi) = βk(Xi) + ∑
j 6=i
αk(Yj, dij,Xi,Qi) + ǫik,
where dij is the network distance from j to i. By such an extension, the interaction term
αk(Yj, dij,Xi,Qi) depends on player j’s choice as well as their network distance. In (1),
direct interactions αk have been set to zero for all j 6∈ Fi. By a similar argument, our
uniqueness andNDD condition of the equilibrium can be established. Amajor difficulty in
developing nonparametric identification and estimation, however, is to consider a model
with an increasing parameter space, since the support of dij expands with the size of the
network. Though significant progress has been made in the regression context (see, e.g.,
Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2011), the different nature of the structural analysis calls for
further work.
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APPENDIX A. EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS AND NETWORK STABILITY
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. Fix n and S = s. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there are
two BNEs, denoted by {σ∗i : i = 1, · · · , n} and {σ†i : i = 1, · · · , n} respectively. For
notational simplicity, throughout we suppress their dependence on S and θ.
For any choice probability profile (σ1, · · · , σn), where σi is a (K+1)–choice probability
distributions, let
Γik
(
si, {σj : j ∈ Fi}
)
=
exp
[
βk(xi) + ∑
K
ℓ=0
{
αk(ℓ, xi, qi)∑j∈Fi σjℓ
}]
1+ ∑Kℓ′=1 exp
[
βℓ′(xi) + ∑
K
ℓ=0
{
αℓ′(ℓ, xi, qi)∑j∈Fi σjℓ
}] . (10)
Let further Γi
(
si, {σj : j ∈ Fi}
)
=
(
Γi0(si, {σj : j ∈ Fi}), · · · , ΓiK(si, {σj : j ∈ Fi})
)′. By
eq. (3), we have σ∗i = Γi(si, {σ∗j : j ∈ Fi}) and σ†i = Γi(si, {σ†j : j ∈ Fi}) for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, for any i ∈ N,
σ∗i − σ†i = Γi
(
si, {σ∗j : j ∈ Fi}
)− Γi(si, {σ†j : j ∈ Fi}) = ∑
j∈Fi
∑
ℓ∈A
∂Γi(si, {σ˜j : j ∈ Fi})
∂σjℓ
· (σ∗jℓ− σ†jℓ)
where {σ˜j : j ∈ Fi} is a vector between {σ∗j : j ∈ Fi} and {σ†j : j ∈ Fi}. By the definition of
Γik, we have
∂ ln Γik
∂σjℓ
= αk(ℓ, xi, qi)−
K
∑
ℓ′=1
Γiℓ′ · αℓ′(ℓ, xi, qi)
=
K
∑
ℓ′=0
Γiℓ′ · αk(ℓ, xi, qi)−
K
∑
ℓ′=0
Γiℓ′ · αℓ′(ℓ, xi, qi)
where the last step is because: (i) ∑Kℓ′=0 Γiℓ′ = 1; (ii) α0(ℓ, x, q) = 0. It follows that
∂Γik
∂σjℓ
= Γik ∑
k′ 6=k
[Γik′ · {αk(ℓ, xi, qi)− αk′(ℓ, xi, qi)}] .
Therefore,
∑
k∈A
∣∣∣∣∂Γik∂σjℓ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆∗(xi, qi) · ∑
k∈A
[Γik (1− Γik)] ≤ ∆∗(xi, qi) · KK+ 1.
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where ∆∗(x, q) ≡ maxk,ℓ,m∈A |αk(ℓ, x, q)− αm(ℓ, x, q)| and the last step comes from the fact
that (i) 0 ≤ Γik ≤ 1; (ii) ∑Kk=0 Γik = 1. Hence,
‖σ∗i − σ†i ‖1 = ∑
k∈A
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Fi
∑
ℓ∈A
∂Γik(si, {σ˜j : j ∈ Fi})
∂σjℓ
· (σ∗jℓ − σ†jℓ)
∣∣∣
≤ ∑
j∈Fi
∑
ℓ∈A
{ ∣∣∣σ∗jℓ − σ†jℓ∣∣∣ · ∑
k∈A
∣∣∣∂Γik(si, {σ˜j : j ∈ Fi})
∂σjℓ
∣∣∣}
≤ ∆∗(xi, qi) · K
K+ 1
· ∑
j∈Fi
∑
ℓ∈A
∣∣∣σ∗jℓ − σ†jℓ∣∣∣
≤ ∆∗(xi, qi) · K
K+ 1
· qi ·max
j∈Fi
‖σ∗j − σ†j ‖1 ≤ λ ·max
j∈Fi
‖σ∗j − σ†j ‖1.
Therefore,
max
i∈N
‖σ∗i − σ†i ‖1 ≤ λ ·max
i∈N
max
j∈Fi
‖σ∗j − σ†j ‖1 ≤ λ ·max
j∈N
‖σ∗j − σ†j ‖1
which leads to contradiction by λ < 1 under assumption B. 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2. This lemma is shown by mathematical induction. Fix arbitrarily
n, h ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ S such that s(i,h) = s′(i,h).
First, for all j ∈ N(i,h), we have sj = s′j. We now derive σ∗j (s; θ) − σ∗j (s′; θ) using Taylor
expansion, i.e.,
σ∗j (s
′; θ)− σ∗j (s; θ) = ∑
j∈Fi
∑
ℓ∈A
∂Γj(sj, {σ˜j′ : j′ ∈ Fj})
∂σj′ℓ
· (σ∗j′ℓ(s′; θ)− σ†j′ℓ(s; θ))
where {σ˜j′ : j′ ∈ Fj} is a vector between {σ∗j′ (s; θ) : j ∈ Fi} and {σ∗j′ (s′; θ) : j ∈ Fi}. By a
similar argument to the proof of Lemma 1, we have
‖σ∗j (s; θ)− σ∗j (s′; θ)‖1 ≤ λ ·max
j′∈Fj
‖σ∗j′ (s; θ)− σ∗j′ (s′; θ)‖1
≤ λ ·max
j′∈Fj
{‖σ∗j′ (s; θ)‖1 + ‖σ∗j′ (s′; θ)‖1} = 2λ,
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where the last inequality comes from the triangular inequality. Because for all j ∈ N(i,h−1),
any friend j′ of j belongs to N(i,h), then
‖σ∗j (s; θ)− σ∗j (s′; θ)‖1 ≤ λ2 · max
j′′∈Fj′ ,j′∈Fi
‖σ∗j′′(s; θ)− σ∗j′′(s′; θ)‖1 ≤ 2λ2.
By induction, for all j ∈ N(i,h−q) where q ≤ h, there is
‖σ∗j (s; θ)− σ∗j (s′; θ)‖1 ≤ 2λq+1.
Hence, for any q ≤ h, we have
max
j∈N(i,h−q)
‖σ∗j (s; θ)− σ∗j (s′; θ)‖1 ≤ 2λq+1.
Because i ∈ N(i,0), then ‖σ∗i (s; θ) − σ∗i (s′; θ)‖1 ≤ 2λh+1. By assumption B, 2λh+1 ↓ 0 as
h → ∞. 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3. First, by assumption C, (5) can be rewritten as
δik(S) = ϕ
′
i(S)×
(
βk(Xi)
αk(Xi,Qi)
)
.
We further multiply by ϕi(S) on both sides and obtain
ϕi(S)× δik(S) = ϕi(S)× ϕ′i(S)×
(
βk(Xi)
αk(Xi,Qi)
)
.
Moreover, we take conditional expectation on both sides given Xi = x and Qi = q:
E[ϕi(S)× δik(S)|Xi = x,Qi = q] = E[ϕi(S)× ϕ′i(S)|Xi = x,Qi = q]×
(
βk(x)
αk(x, q)
)
from which we invert the coefficients vector (βk(x), α′k(x, q))
′. 
APPENDIX B. ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES UNDER PARAMETRIC SETTING
For any c ∈ Θ, let Ln(c) = 1n ∑ni=1 ∑k∈A E
[
σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ
∗
ik(S; c)
]
. For arbitrary ǫ > 0, let
Bǫ(θ) be an open ball centered at θ with ǫ radius in the space Θ.
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B.1. Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 4, it suffices to check the conditions (i) – (iii) in
the lemma. By the identification argument and assumption F, condition (i) holds. More-
over, condition (iii) also holds by Lemma 5. Hence, it suffices to verify condition (ii), i.e.
supc∈Θ
∣∣Lˆ(c)− Ln(c)∣∣ p→ 0.
By Lemmas 6 and 7, ∑Kk=0 1(Yi = k) ln σ
∗
ik(S; ·) is bounded and continuous on Θ. Since
Θ is compact, then Fn =
{
∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) ln σ∗ik(S; c) : c ∈ Θ
}
can be covered by a finite
number of ǫ–brackets. To apply the classical Glivenko-Cantelli argument, it suffices to
show the point–wise law of large number, i.e. for any c ∈ Θ, Lˆ(c)− Ln(c) p→ 0.
We pick an integer dn ∝ 0.5 ln n/ ln c0. Clearly, dn → ∞ as n → ∞. Then we have
Lˆ(c)− Ln(c) = 1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
{
1(Yi = k)− σ∗ik(S; θ)
}
ln σ∗ik(S; c)
+
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
{
σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ
∗
ik(S; c)− σdnik (S; θ) ln σdnik (S; c)
}
+
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
{
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)−E
[
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)
]}
+
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
{
E
[
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)
]
−E [σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ∗ik(S; c)]
}
. (11)
For the first term of right–hand side in eq. (11), we have
E
{[ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
(1(Yi = k)− σ∗ik(S; θ)) ln σ∗ik(S; c)
]2∣∣∣S}
=
1
n2
n
∑
i=1
E
{[
∑
k∈A
(1(Yi = k)− σ∗ik(S; θ)) ln σ∗ik(S; c)
]2∣∣∣S} ≤ 1
n
(K + 1)2(ln σ0)2 → 0
where the first step is because of the reasons that Yi is conditionally independent given
S and that E(Yi|S) = σ∗ik(S; θ), and the last inequality is due to the fact: ln σ0 ≤
(
1(Yi =
k)− σ∗ik(S; θ)
)
ln σ∗ik(S; c) ≤ − ln σ0 under Lemma 6.
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Next, for the second term of RHS in eq. (11), note that
E
∣∣∣σ∗ik(S; θ) ln σ∗ik(S; c)− σdnik (S; θ) ln σdnik (S; c)∣∣∣
≤ E
[∣∣σ∗ik(S; θ)− σdnik (S; θ)∣∣ · |ln σ∗ik(S; c)|]+ E [∣∣σdnik (S; θ)∣∣ · ∣∣ ln σ∗ik(S; c)− ln σdnik (S; c)∣∣]
≤ − ln σ0 ·E
∣∣σ∗ik(S; θ)− σdnik (S; θ)∣∣+ 1σ0 ·E∣∣σ∗ik(S; c)− σdnik (S; c)∣∣→ 0.
Similarly, we can show that the last term in eq. (11) is also op(1).
Therefore, it suffices to show that the third term of RHS in eq. (11) is also op(1). Note
that
E
{ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
[
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)−Eσdnik (S; θ) ln σdnik (S; c)
]}2
=
1
n2
n
∑
i,j=1
Cov
(
∑
k∈A
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c), ∑
k∈A
σdnjk (S; θ) ln σ
dn
jk (S; c)
)
.
By definition and assumption I, σdni (S; θ) is independent of σ
dn
j (S; θ) if there does not exist a
playerm ∈ N(i,dn)
⋂
N(j,dn). By assumption J, there are at most n · (1+ c0+ · · · cdn0 ) ≤ ncdn+10
pair of (i, j) such that σdni (S; θ) and σ
dn
j (S; θ) are dependent of each other. Moreover, for any
i and j,
2Cov
(
∑
k∈A
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c), ∑
k∈A
σdnjk (S; θ) ln σ
dn
jk (S; c)
)
≤ E
(
∑
k∈A
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)
)2
+ E
(
∑
k∈A
σdnjk (S; θ) ln σ
dn
jk (S; c)
)2
≤ 2(1+ K)2(ln σ0)2.
Therefore,
E
{ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
{
σdnik (S; θ) ln σ
dn
ik (S; c)−Eσdnik (S; θ) ln σdnik (S; c)
}}2
≤ 1
n2
· ncdn+10 2(1+ K)2(ln σ0)2 ∝
1√
n
2c0(1+ K)2(ln σ0)2 → 0. 
Lemma 4. Suppose (i) lim supn→∞ supc 6∈Bǫ(θ) (Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) < 0 holds for any ǫ > 0; (ii)
Lˆn converges uniformly in probability to Ln, i.e. supc∈Θ
∣∣Lˆn(c)− Ln(c)∣∣ p→ 0; (iii) Lˆn(θˆ) ≥
supc∈Θ Lˆn(c)− op(1). Then θ̂
p→ θ.
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Proof. To prove the lemma, we modify the proofs in Newey and McFadden (1994), Theo-
rem 2.1. Note that the objective function Ln(·) in our case depends on n, and it converges
to a limit as n goes to infinity. By (ii) and (iii), with probability approaching one (w.p.a.1),
Ln(θˆ) > Lˆn(θˆ)− η/3 > Lˆn(θ)− 2η/3 > Ln(θ)− η, ∀η > 0.
Then, for any ǫ > 0, choose η = − 12 lim supn→∞ supc 6∈Bǫ(θ) (Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) > 0. It
follows that w.p.a.1,
Ln(θˆ)− Ln(θ) > 12 lim supn→∞
sup
c 6∈Bǫ(θ)
(Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) .
Because for sufficient large n,
sup
c 6∈Bǫ(θ)
(Ln(c)− Ln(θ))− lim sup
n→∞
sup
c 6∈Bǫ(θ)
(Ln(c)− Ln(θ))
≤ η = −1
2
lim sup
n→∞
sup
c 6∈Bǫ(θ)
(Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) ,
which implies 12 lim supn→∞ supc 6∈Bǫ(θ) (Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) ≥ supc 6∈Bǫ(θ) (Ln(c)− Ln(θ)).
Therefore, w.p.a.1,
Ln(θˆ)− Ln(θ) > sup
c 6∈Bǫ(θ)
(Ln(c)− Ln(θ)) ,
which implies that θˆ ∈ Bǫ(θ) w.p.a.1. Because ǫ can be arbitrarily small, θ̂ p→ θ. 
Lemma 5. Suppose that assumption A, G–(i) and H hold. Then,
Lˆ(θˆ) ≥ sup
c∈Θ
Lˆ(c)− op(1).
Proof. By the definition of θˆ, it suffices to show that supc∈Θ
∣∣Qˆ(c)− Lˆ(c)∣∣→ 0.
Because
sup
c∈Θ
|Qˆ(c)− Lˆ(c)| ≤ sup
c∈Θ
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∑
k∈A
∣∣ ln σhik (S; c)− ln σ∗ik(S; c)∣∣.
By Taylor expansion,
∑
k∈A
∣∣ ln σhik (S|c)− ln σ∗ik(S; c)∣∣ = 1σ† ∑
k∈A
∣∣σhik (S; c)− σ∗ik(S; c)∣∣ ≤ 2λh+1σ0 ,
37
where σ† is some real value between σhik (S; c) and σ
∗
ik(S; c), and σ0 is the lower bound of
the equilibrium choice probability. The last step uses Lemmas 2 and 6. Thus,
sup
c∈Θ
∣∣Qˆ(c)− Lˆ(c)∣∣ ≤ 2λh+1
σ0
.
Because of assumption K and λ < 1, we have supc∈Θ
∣∣Qˆ(c)− Lˆ(c)∣∣ p→ 0. 
B.2. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. First, by the proof of Lemma 5 and assumption K–(ii),
sup
c∈Θ
∣∣Qˆ(c)− Lˆ(c)∣∣ ≤ 2(K + 1)λh
σ0
= op(n
−1).
Hence, Lˆ(θˆ) ≥ supc∈Θ Lˆ(c)− op(n−1), which implies that ∂Lˆ(θˆ)/∂c = op(n−1/2).
By the Taylor expansion, we have
∂Lˆ(θ)
∂c
+
∂2 Lˆ(θ†)
∂c∂c′
(θˆ − θ) = op(n−1/2)
for some θ† between θ and θˆ. Now it suffices to show:
√
n× ∂Lˆ(θ)
∂c
d→ N(0, J(θ)), (12)
∂2 Lˆ(θ†)
∂c∂c′
p→ −J(θ). (13)
We first show eq. (12). Let ξi = ∂∂c ∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) ln σ
∗
ik(S; c)|c=θ. Note that the true
parameter θ always maximizes the likelihood function E
[
∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) ln σ∗ik(S; ·)|S
]
for
any n and S. Thus E (ξi|S) = 0.
By definition, ∂Lˆ(θ)/∂c = n−1 ∑ni=1 ξi. Then, it suffices to show that n−1/2 ∑
n
i=1 ξi
d→
N(0, J(θ)). Equivalently, we need to show n−1/2 ∑ni=1 J(θ)−
1
2 ξi
d→ N(0, 1P), where 1P
is the P–by–P identity matrix. For this, we show that the conditional distribution of
√
n∑ni=1 J(θ)
− 12 ξi given S always converges to the same limiting normal distributionN(0, 1P).
Because ξi is conditionally independent across i given S. Then
E
[(
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
ξi
) · (n−1/2 n∑
i=1
ξ′i
)∣∣∣S] = n−1 n∑
i=1
E
(
ξi · ξ′i
∣∣S) .
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By a similar argument to that in the proof of Theorem 2, we have
n−1
n
∑
i=1
E
(
ξi · ξ′i
∣∣S) = n−1 n∑
i=1
E
(
ξi · ξ′i
)
+ op(1) = Jn(θ) + op(1) = J(θ) + op(1).
Thus,
E
[(
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
ξi
) · (n−1/2 n∑
i=1
ξ′i
)∣∣∣S] p→ J(θ).
Hence, by the Lindeberg-Feller Theorem (see e.g. Van der Vaart, 2000), conditional on S,
n−1/2
n
∑
i=1
J(θ)−
1
2 ξi
d→ N(0, 1P)
We now show eq. (13). Under assumption G, it follows from Lemmas 6 and 7 that∥∥∥ ∂2∂c∂c′ ∑k∈A 1(Yi = k) ln σ∗ik(S; c)∥∥∥ is bounded above uniformly on n, S and θ, and ∂2∂c∂c′ ∑k∈A 1(Yi =
k) ln σ∗ik(S; c) are smooth functions of c ∈ Θ. Hence by a similar argument as the proofs in
Theorem 2,
sup
c∈Θ
[
∂Lˆ(c)
∂c∂c′
− 1
n
n
∑
i=1
E
{
∂2
∂c∂c′ ∑
k∈A
1(Yi = k) ln σ∗ik(S; c)
}]
p→ 0.
Because θ†
p→ θ and by assumption I, we have
∂2 Lˆ(θ†)
∂c∂c′
= E
{
∂2
∂c∂c′ ∑
k∈A
1(Y1 = k) ln σ∗1k(S; θ)
}
+ op(1).
Moreover, by the information matrix equality,
E
{
∂2
∂c∂c′ ∑
k∈A
1(Y1 = k) ln σ∗1k(S; θ)
}
= −Jn(θ) = −J(θ) + o(1).
Then eq. (13) is proved. 
APPENDIX C. AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Lemma 6. Suppose assumption A and G–(i) hold. Then there exists σ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
σ∗ik(S; c) ≥ σ0 for all n ∈ N, i ∈ N, k ∈ A and c ∈ Θ.
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Proof. By assumption A, for all (i, k) ∈ N × A,
σ∗ik(S; c) =
exp
{
(X′i ,Qi) · bk + ∑ℓ∈A akℓ
( 1
Qi
∑j∈Fi σ
∗
jℓ(S; c)
)}
1+ ∑Kℓ′=1 exp
{
(X′i ,Qi)bℓ′ + ∑ℓ∈A aℓ′ℓ
( 1
Qi
∑j∈Fi σ
∗
jℓ′(S; c)
)} .
Because 0 ≤ 1Qi ∑j∈Fi σ∗jℓ(S; c) ≤ 1 and by assumption G–(i), the RHS has a lower bound,
denoted as σ0 > 0. Note that the above argument does not depend on the value of n, i, k
and c. 
Lemma 7. Suppose that assumptions A and H hold. Then, σ∗ik(S; ·) ∈ C∞(Θ) for all n ∈ N, S,
i ∈ N, k ∈ A and c ∈ Θ.
Proof. We fix an arbitrary n and S in the following analysis. By Lemma 1, {σ∗i (S; c) : i ∈ N}
is the unique solution to the equation system: for all (i, k) ∈ (N, A),
σ∗ik =
exp
[
bk(Xi,Qi) + ∑
K
l=0
{
ak(ℓ,Xi,Qi) ·∑j∈Fi σ∗jℓ
}]
1+ ∑Kq=1 exp
[
bq(Xi,Qi) + ∑Kl=0
{
aq(ℓ,Xi,Qi) ·∑j∈Fi σ∗jℓ
}] .
Let Σ∗ = (σ∗1 , · · · , σ∗n ). Then the above equation system can be represented as
Σ∗ = BR(S,Σ∗; c)
where BR is the n(K + 1) dimensional mapping representing the best response functions
for all (i, k) ∈ (N, A). Fix S. Clearly, BR belongs to C∞
(
Rn(K+1) ×Θ
)
. Then by implicit
function theorem, the solution σ∗i (S; ·) ∈ C∞ (Θ) for all i ∈ N. 
APPENDIX D. CONSISTENT NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATOR OF PYi|S
The NDD condition is important for large network asymptotics. In particular, it allows
us to nonparametrically estimate the probability distributionPYi|S using observations from
one single large network. To illustrate, we consider the simple circle network where each
player has two direct friends and the friendship is symmetric. Such a specification helps
highlights key features of the consistency argument for the nonparametric estimation.
Because our asymptotic analysis considers a sequence of games with n → ∞, we use Sn
with subscript n to emphasize its dependence on the network size in the following analysis.
The sequence of games are described as follows: Let the set of players {1, 2, · · · , n} for
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n ≥ 2 be located on a circle network as follows: First we randomly pick a location for
player 1 on the circle. Next, players 2 and 3 are on 1’s left and right, respectively; then
players 4 and 5 are further located on 2’s left and 3’s right, respectively; so on and so
forth. Thus we obtain a circle network with n = +∞ in the limit. Given the network,
state variables Xi are i.i.d. across all the players. Similarly to the probability theory in time
series, the probability distribution of the sequence {Sn : n ≥ 2} is well defined.
For simplicity, let A = {0, 1} and Xi ∈ R. W.o.l.g., we consider the estimation of
P(Yi = 1|Sn = sn) for i = 1. To begin with, we first consider the case where Xi is binary,
i.e., Xi ∈ {0, 1}. It is straightforward that our arguments can be generalized to the case
of multiple valued Xi’s. The continuous Xi’s case will be discussed later. Intuitively, a
nonparametric estimator Pˆ(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn) can be defined as follows:
∑
n
j=1 1(Yj = 1) · 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]
∑
n
j=1 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
] ,
where j(ℓ) denotes the |ℓ|-th left vertex of j if ℓ < 0; otherwise it refers to the |ℓ|-th right
vertex of j. Note that because of the circle network, G(j,h) = g(1,h) a.s.. Then, the term
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
is redundant in the above expression. As is shown in the proof of the
next lemma, the above estimator is essentially a kernel estimator with a specific choice of
bandwidth and a uniform kernel.
In the above estimator, It is crucial to choose h for its consistency, which carries a bias and
variance tradeoff: Intuitively, h ∈ N needs to increase properly with n such that P(Y1 =
1|S(1,h)) converges to P(Y1 = 1|Sn) (note that the approximation error is bounded by 2ξh+1
where |ξ| < 1). On the other hand, we require the number of observations G(j,h) = g(1,h)
goes to infinity with the network size, so that the variance of the estimator decreases to
zero as n → ∞.
W.l.o.g., supposeP(Xi = 0) ≤ 1/2. Moreover, let ph ≡ P(S(1,h) = s(1,h)) = ∏2h+1j=1 P(Xj =
xj). By definition, P(Xi = 0)2h+1 ≤ ph ≤ P(Xi = 1)2h+1. Therefore, we have ph → 0 as
h → ∞.
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Lemma 8. Suppose that assumptions A and F, G-(i), I and J hold. Suppose h → ∞ and hnph → 0
as n → ∞. Then
Pˆ(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn)−P(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn) p→ 0
Proof. First note that
Pˆ(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn)
=
1
nph
∑
n
j=1 1(Yj = 1) · 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]
1
nph
∑
n
j=1 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
] ,
We now show that the denominator and numerator converge to one and P(Y1 = 1|S(1,h) =
s(1,h)), respectively. First, we look at denominator and show
E
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]}
→ 1; (14)
Var
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]}
→ 0. (15)
Regarding (14), we have
E
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
{Xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(j,h)} = {xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(1,h)}
]}
=
1
ph
E
{
1
[
S(1,h) = s(1,h)
]}
= 1.
To establish (15), note that
Var
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
{Xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(j,h)} = {xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(1,h)}
]}
=
1
n2p2h
n
∑
ℓ=1
∑
j 6=ℓ
Cov
{
1
[
S(j,h) = s(1,h)
]
, 1
[
S(ℓ,h) = s(1,h)
]}
+
1
np2h
Var
{
1
[
S(1,h) = s(1,h)
]}
=
1
np2h
∑
j 6=1
Cov
{
1
[
S(j,h) = s(1,h)
]
, 1
[
S(1,h) = s(1,h)
]}
+
1− ph
nph
=
1
np2h
2h+1
∑
j=2
Cov
{
1
[
S(j,h) = s(1,h)
]
, 1
[
S(1,h) = s(1,h)
]}
+
1− ph
nph
,
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where the last step comes from the assumption that S(j,h) is independent of S(1,h) if N(j,h)
does not overlap with N(1,h). Thus,
Var
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
{Xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(j,h)} = {xℓ : ℓ ∈ N(1,h)}
]}
≤ 2h
np2h
×
Var
{
1
[
S(j,h) = s(1,h)
]}
+Var
{
1
[
S(1,h) = s(1,h)
]}
2
+
1− ph
nph
=
(2h+ 1)(1− ph)
nph
∝
h
nph
→ 0.
It follows that
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]
p→ 1
By a similar argument, we have
E
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1(Yj = 1) · 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]}
= P(Y1 = 1|S(1,h) = s(1,h)) = P(Y1 = k|Sn = sn) + o(|ξ|h)
and
Var
{
1
nph
n
∑
j=1
1(Yj = 1) · 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
· 1
[
Xj(ℓ) = x1(ℓ), for ℓ = −h, · · · , h
]}
→ 0.
Moreover, by Slutsky’s theorem, we establish the consistency of the proposed estimator.

In Lemma 8, it is required that h should increase to infinity with n, but sufficiently slow. In
particular, the conditions imply ph → 0 and nph → ∞ as n → ∞. This suggests that the
term ph plays the same role as the bandwidth in kernel estimation. In addition, because of
the dependence between S(j,h) and S(i,h) for ρ(i, j) ≤ h, we require nph increase to infinity
faster than h. Suppose one chooses h = [h0× ln n] for some constant h0 > 0. Then, ph ∝ n−κ
where κ > 0 that is determined by h0 and P(Xi = 0). Then the restrictions on h in Lemma 8
are satisfied if κ is sufficiently small.
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Suppose Xi is continuously distributed. Let fX be the pdf of Xi. For simplicity, We
assume 0 < infx∈R fX(x) < supx∈R fX(x) < ∞. As usual, additional assumptions on
the structural parameters are needed to ensure P(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn) is R–th (R ≥ 2) order
continuously differentiable in each argument of Sn. Moreover, a nonparametric estimator
is defined by
Pˆ(Y1 = 1|Sn = sn) =
∑
n
j=1 1(Yj = 1) · 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
·∏2h+1ℓ=1 K
(
Xℓ−xℓ
bℓ
)
∑
n
j=1 1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
·∏2h+1ℓ=1 K
(
Xℓ−xℓ
bℓ
) ,
where K and bℓ for ℓ = 1, · · · , 2h + 1 are R–th order kernel function and bandwidth, re-
spectively.
For consistency, we need to choose h → ∞ and bℓ → 0 for ℓ = 1, · · · , 2h+ 1 properly as
n → ∞. For simplicity, let bℓ fX(xℓ) = p for some p ≡ pn > 0. Moreover, let h → ∞, p → 0
and h/(np2h+1) → 0 as n → ∞. By a similar argument to Lemma 8 and Bochner’s Lemma,
we can show consistency of the kernel estimator. In particular, we have
E
{
1
np2h+1
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
·
2h+1
∏
ℓ=1
K
(
Xℓ − xℓ
bℓ
)}
= 1+O(pR)
and
Var
{
1
np2h+1
n
∑
j=1
1
[
G(j,h) = g(1,h)
]
·
2h+1
∏
ℓ=1
K
(
Xℓ − xℓ
bℓ
)}
= O
( h
np2h+1
)
,
and similar expressions hold for the numerator of the kernel estimator, which provide the
consistency.
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